Opinion
The Illusion of Change: Revisiting the US Embargo on Cuba
New financial measures in the US raise questions about their real beneficiaries in Cuba’s power structure.
By Javier Prada | cubanet.org
The recent decision by the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to allow Cuban private sector entrepreneurs to open and use bank accounts in the US has sparked significant controversy and debate. Despite Cuba remaining on the list of countries that sponsor terrorism, this measure appears to signal a shift in US policy, though its implications are complex and potentially problematic.
In mid-May, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken announced that Cuba would no longer be categorized as a country that insufficiently cooperates in combating terrorism. This move, while stopping short of removing Cuba from the terrorism sponsor list, has paved the way for differentiated treatment by the White House. The regime in Havana has publicly decried this policy while privately celebrating the financial windfall it represents.
This development allows millions of untraceable dollars to flow into the Cuban economy through intermediaries loyal to the regime. These proxies have long supported the Cuban government’s continuity and interests. Ironically, the Cuban government has responded to this US “benevolence” by inviting the Russian Navy, including a nuclear submarine, to dock in Cuban waters. This visit allows Russian sailors, stressed by the Ukraine invasion, a respite in the Caribbean.
Meanwhile, Europe sees a political shift with the right gaining ground in Parliament, overshadowing pro-Cuban deputies like Manu Pineda. The financial relief brought by the OFAC’s decision seems to have reinvigorated Cuba’s economic landscape, albeit temporarily.
CNN’s coverage of Dador, a private Cuban business, highlights its connections to the regime. Dador notably dresses Lis Cuesta Peraza, the wife of President Miguel Díaz-Canel, in luxury brands, underscoring the intertwining of private enterprise and state privilege. This example casts doubt on the narrative that empowering the private sector occurs against the government’s will.
Additionally, figures like Hugo Cancio, a close associate of Díaz-Canel, are expanding their influence in remittance and online commerce sectors, illustrating how regime-friendly individuals benefit from these policy changes. The recent restoration of oil shipments from Mexico further underscores the interconnectedness of economic relief and political maneuvering, with the military conglomerate GAESA playing a pivotal role.
Amid these shifts, there’s a surge in defections among those previously aligned with the regime. An ex-judge from Villa Clara, implicated in wrongful imprisonments, has sought asylum in the US, highlighting the precarious position of regime officials. Many such individuals now seek refuge in the US, taking advantage of humanitarian parole or migrating through the “volcano route” to avoid retribution.
As more regime-affiliated individuals flee and significant financial resources remain in the hands of those aligned with the generals, the call to lift the embargo grows louder. Critics argue that the embargo now primarily serves as a scapegoat for corruption, administrative theft, and political persecution within Cuba.
Read the full opinion article in English on cubanet.org, assisted by Google Translate.